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ALGORITHMIC DESTRUCTION
Tiffany C. Li*

ABSTRACT
Contemporary privacy law does not go far enough to protect our privacy
interests, particularly where artificial intelligence and machine learning are
concerned. While many have written on problems of algorithmic bias and
data deletion, this Article introduces the novel concept of the “algorithmic
shadow” and explains the new privacy remedy of “algorithmic destruction,” also known as algorithmic disgorgement or machine unlearning.
The algorithmic shadow describes the persistent imprint of training data
that has been fed into a machine learning model and used to refine that
machine learning system. This shadow persists even if data is deleted from
the initial training data set, which means privacy rights like data deletion do
not solve for the new class of privacy harms that arise from algorithmic
shadows. Algorithmic destruction (deletion of models or algorithms
trained on misbegotten data) has emerged as an alternative, or perhaps
supplementary remedy and regulatory enforcement tool to address these
new harms.
This Article introduces two concepts to legal scholarship—the algorithmic shadow and algorithmic destruction. First, the Article defines the
concept of the algorithmic shadow, a novel concept that has so far evaded
significant legal scholarly discussion, despite its importance in changing
understandings of privacy risks and harms. Second, the Article argues that
data deletion does not solve for algorithmic shadow harms and advocates
for the development of new privacy remedies to address these new harms.
Finally, the Article introduces algorithmic destruction as a potential right
and remedy, explaining its theoretical and practical applications, as well as
potential drawbacks and concerns.
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I. INTRODUCTION

W

HEN you are arrested in America, you are awarded certain
rights—among them is the right to a fair and speedy trial.1 You
may expect certain things from your justice system, and,
broadly speaking, in many cases, you would be right to expect them. For
example, you might expect that there will be a judge (preferably learned,
preferably wise, hopefully fair) who will guide the proceedings and who
will, should you be found guilty, determine a fair and proportionate punishment for your misdoings.
You might not expect the artificial intelligence (AI). That is, you might
not expect that, throughout the criminal justice process, some key analysis influencing your ultimate legal consequences will be performed, not by
humans but by automated decision-making systems.2 You might not expect the AI, but having heard of it, you might, in fact, suspect the AI. You
would be right to do so.
In 2016, the investigative reporting outlet ProPublica broke the thenshocking news that many criminal sentencing decisions (which we would

1. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. See Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias,
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/TFL5-JS78] (criticizing automated “risk assessments . . . used to inform decisions about who can be set free at every stage of the
criminal justice system”).
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like to believe are fair and just) were made using an automated system
that employed a form of AI known as machine learning.3 The AI helped
determine appropriate sentences based on an analysis of factors that supposedly predicted the likelihood for any particular defendant to re-offend.4 ProPublica’s investigation found that the system, Correctional
Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions, or COMPAS,
produced consistently discriminatory results.5 Using COMPAS for sentencing resulted in judgments awarding heavier sentences to Black defendants and lighter sentences to White defendants, regardless of the
severity of the crime or other relevant factors.6
The problems of algorithmic bias in the criminal justice system are not
new. Countless well-respected scholars and advocates have dedicated
great portions of their careers to raising awareness about, and potentially
solving issues related to, algorithmic bias and algorithmic fairness in the
criminal justice system and across all sectors of human activity.7 This Article will not rehash decades of debate on the subject. Nor will it provide
an exhaustive overview of the legal and philosophical dimensions of deletion in privacy conceptualization.8
3. See id.
4. One of the “most widely used assessment tools in the country . . . gave ProPublica
the basics of its future-crime formula—which includes factors such as education levels, and
whether a defendant has a job.” Id.
5. Id. But for another perspective on COMPAS’s potential bias, see Sam CorbettDavies, Emma Pierson, Avi Feller & Sharad Goel, A Computer Program Used for Bail and
Sentencing Decisions Was Labeled Biased Against Blacks. It’s Actually Not That Clear,
WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.comnews/monkey-cage/wp/2016/
10/17/can-an-algorithm-be-racist-our-analysis-is-more-cautious-than-propublicas [https://
perma.cc/J8S8-SHMR].
6. See Angwin, Larson, Mattu & Kirchner, supra note 2.
7. See, e.g., Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy
Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC. MACH. LEARNING RSCH. 1
(2018), https://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a/buolamwini18a.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5YY7-RG28]; SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW
SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM (2018); VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671
(2016); Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias Intervention, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1671 (2020); Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W.
Felten, Joel R. Reidenberg, David G. Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165
U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2017); Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery:
Google Ads, Black Names and White Names, Racial Discrimination, and Click Advertising,
ACM QUEUE 1 (Apr. 2, 2013), https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/2460276.2460278 [https://
perma.cc/U9HR-QL9W]; Kate Crawford & Ryan Calo, Opinion, There Is a Blind Spot in
AI Research, 538 NATURE 311 (2016), https://www.nature.com/articles/538311a.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VX9D-YQGY]; Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 857 (2017); Crystal S. Yang & Will Dobbie, Equal Protection Under Algorithms: A New Statistical and Legal Framework, 119 MICH. L. REV. 291 (2020). The past
few decades have witnessed an explosion of research into problems of machine bias and
algorithmic fairness, including multiple conferences dedicated to the subject. See, e.g.,
ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, ACM FACCT CONFERENCE, https://facctconference.org/index.html [https://perma.cc/2YP9-PQ7F]; ACM Conferences, ACM, https://dl.acm.org/conferences [https://perma.cc/Q7W4-KAYZ].
8. For an in-depth discussion of the legal and philosophical dimensions of deletion,
see VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2009); MEG LETA JONES, CTRL + Z: THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN (2016).
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This Article introduces the novel concept of the “algorithmic shadow”9
and uses the algorithmic shadow as a lens through which to view the failures of current privacy and AI laws in dealing with the realities of AI and
machine learning. In particular, this Article critiques data deletion. It is
also the first scholarly work to substantively critique the novel privacy
remedy of algorithmic disgorgement, also known as algorithmic destruction, machine unlearning, or machine learning model deletion.
Data deletion is not a meaningful right or remedy in the advent of machine learning systems. Data deletion as a remedy does not comport with
the spirit of privacy laws that seek to make victims whole, and it does not
solve the harms that privacy laws seek to prevent.10 The failure of data
deletion to resolve the privacy losses caused by algorithmic shadows highlights the ineffectiveness of data deletion as a right and a remedy.
Various proposals for algorithmic destruction have emerged as an alternative, or perhaps a supplement, to data deletion.11 Algorithmic disgorgement has so far been used as an enforcement tool requiring organizations
to delete machine learning models and algorithms developed with misbegotten data.12 While algorithmic disgorgement may resolve some of the
failures of data deletion—namely, the failure to address the harms of the
algorithmic shadow—this remedy and potential right is not without its
own drawbacks.13
What is the algorithmic shadow? Simply put, when you enter a set of
specific data to train a machine learning model, that data creates an impact on the model.14 Even if you later delete data from the training data
set, the already-trained model still contains a persistent “shadow” of the
deleted data. In other words, the act of deleting data from the initial
training data set has no bearing on the machine learning model that has
already been trained on that data. The algorithmic shadow thus describes
the persistent imprint of the data that has been fed into a machine learning model and used to refine that machine learning system.
This Article has three goals. First, it will introduce and define the concept of the algorithmic shadow, a novel concept that has so far evaded
significant legal scholarly discussion despite its importance in future discussions of AI and privacy law.15 Second, the Article explains why the
algorithmic shadow exposes and exacerbates existing problems with data
deletion as a privacy right and remedy.16 Finally, the Article examines
9. With thanks to Andy Sellars, who suggested this phrasing the first time I explained
the kernel of an idea that eventually became this Article way back in 2019.
10. See infra Section IV.B.
11. See Kate Kaye, The FTC’s New Enforcement Weapon Spells Death for Algorithms,
PROTOCOL (Mar. 14, 2022), https://www.protocol.com/policy/ftc-algorithm-destroy-dataprivacy [https://perma.cc/QG2P-Y2NJ].
12. See id.
13. See infra Section V.D.
14. See Rachel Wolff, What Is Training Data in Machine Learning?, MONKEYLEARN
(Nov. 2, 2020), https://monkeylearn.com/blog/training-data [https://perma.cc/FV83-XW4C].
15. Infra Part III.
16. Infra Part IV.
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algorithmic destruction as a potential right and remedy and compares it
with data deletion in relieving algorithmic shadow harms.17
II. BACKGROUND
This Article builds upon past work on privacy and AI, critiquing the
failure of privacy laws to address the technical realities of computing and
algorithmic harms. In a prior co-authored article, Humans Forget, Machines Remember: Artificial Intelligence and the Right to Be Forgotten, my
co-authors and I wrote on the fundamental failure of “the right to be
forgotten” and the general concept of a right to erasure, specifically in the
context of AI and machine learning.18 We argued that deletion is a flawed
privacy remedy due to the technical limitations of deleting information in
machine learning systems.19
It is important to understand and critique the right to deletion, or deletion, as a privacy remedy, if for no other reason than its prevalence in a
multitude of privacy laws and proposals for privacy reform.20 Many modern privacy laws like the European Union’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) include a right to deletion, right to erasure, right to
be forgotten, or similar rights.21 While there is yet no federal omnibus
privacy law in the United States,22 state laws like California’s Consumer
Privacy Act include rights to deletion as privacy remedies.23
Deletion rights appear in some form in many privacy laws, and the intent behind these laws is well-meaning. However, deletion fails as a remedy for privacy harms due to technical limitations in machine learning. To
fully explore this, we must start by understanding how deletion works in
machine learning systems. In Humans Forget, Machines Remember, my
co-authors and I urged academics to pursue more interdisciplinary research and policymakers to work with researchers in order to craft laws
that better account for the technical realities of machine learning.24
This Article attempts to further that discussion by casting light on one
underdeveloped notion in machine learning discussions—the algorithmic
shadow—as an example of how the law and legal scholarly discussions
have misconstrued AI and machine learning. Data deletion fails as a remedy due to problems like the algorithmic shadow’s persisting harms, but
the fact that issues like algorithmic shadows are ignored also exposes the
17. Infra Part V.
18. Eduard Fosch Villaronga, Peter Kieseberg & Tiffany Li, Humans Forget, Machines
Remember: Artificial Intelligence and the Right to Be Forgotten, 34 COMPUT. L. & SEC.
REV. 304 (2018).
19. Id. at 305, 308–10.
20. See id. at 305–07, 310–12.
21. See Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU) [hereinafter
GDPR].
22. See Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-usapproach-data-protection [https://perma.cc/83LX-6HYW].
23. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105 (West 2018).
24. See Villaronga, Kieseberg & Li, supra note 18, at 305, 311–13.
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underlying problems of vagueness, uncertainty, and lack of technical
specificity in legal discussions surrounding AI.
A. DEFINITIONS
In an article that discusses problems stemming from a lack of technical
specificity and misapplication of law to technology, it is perhaps most fitting to begin with definitions. This Article is not a dictionary, and the
author recognizes that many of the following defined terms have multiple
debatable definitions that are relevant in different fields and subfields.
However, for the purposes of this Article, the following definitions are
useful in providing a foundational common ground for readers seeking to
understand this Article and, more broadly, the legal academic discourse
surrounding AI and machine learning.
1. Artificial Intelligence
AI is a popular buzzword,25 and like most buzzwords, it can mean everything and nothing at the same time. However, definitions are important, particularly as the law around AI develops. It is important that
future legal proposals not conflate terms like AI, machine learning, and
algorithms.26
At our current stage of technological development, AI is much less fantastical than the phrase may sound at first; we are not talking about
superintelligence, which is merely theoretical today.27 Rather, when we
refer to AI in law and policy discussions, we often focus on relatively
simple decision-making or prediction systems.28
AI refers to any form of intelligence that is man-made or artificial, generally relating to the idea of a constructed machine intelligence that could
potentially equal the intelligence of a human being.29 This Article primarily discusses the form of AI known as machine learning.
25. Bernard Marr, What Is the Difference Between Artificial Intelligence and Machine
Learning?, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2016, 2:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/
2016/12/06/what-is-the-difference-between-artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning/
?sh=7aadcd342742 [https://perma.cc/B7NE-FMGR].
26. This Article attempts to use these terms carefully. However, the author acknowledges that it may contain overlooked missteps in usage of such terms, which, to be fair, is
something that happens often in our laws and legal scholarly discussions surrounding artificial intelligence. Perhaps counterintuitively, there is an argument for scholarship focusing
on the technical details of artificial intelligence, written to be intelligible to computer scientists, to coincide with the typical approach to scholarship: writing couched in the broad,
highly abstracted language that policymakers will undoubtedly end up using in creating
actual laws, and that judges will use in crafting actual decisions on those laws.
27. See generally NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES (2014).
28. See, e.g., Angwin, Larson, Mattu & Kirchner, supra note 2.
29. See Michael Cheng-Tek Tai, The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Human Society
and Bioethics, 32 TZU CHI MED. J. 339, 339 (2020).
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2. Algorithms
An algorithm is a set of instructions.30 In the computing context, an
algorithm is a set of instructions or rules for a computer to do certain
things in order to complete a task or solve a problem.31 For machine
learning, algorithms are sets of instructions or rules for a computer follows to discover patterns in data and make predictions or find solutions.32
3. Data
Data is information, including numbers, text, and facts.33 In computing,
data describes pieces of information that can be used, processed, and
stored by computers.34 In machine learning, training data is the initial set
of data that humans prepare and input into a computer to create a machine learning model.35 Testing data is the data used to test the accuracy
or aptness of a machine learning model that has been trained on a separate set of training data.36
4. Machine Learning Models
A machine learning model is created by tasking a computer with running an algorithm on a given set of data until the computer “learns” a
mathematical model to use to achieve whatever goal the human programmers set for the machine learning system.37 For example, if programmers
want to design a machine learning system to identify which ice cream
flavors are the most delicious, one way to do this could be to train a
machine learning system on training data related to ice cream flavors and
deliciousness ratings. Programmers could task a computer to analyze that
training data and discover the underlying patterns that relate to flavors
and deliciousness. The output from a computer running an algorithm on
that training data could be a machine learning model that finds patterns
30. Algorithm, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/algorithm [https://perma.cc/63PT-6CFP] (defining algorithm as “a set of mathematical instructions or rules that, especially if given to a computer, will help to calculate an
answer to a problem”).
31. Understanding Algorithms in Computer Science, INT’L UNIV. GENEVA, https://
www.iun.ch/en-en/blog/computer-science/algorithm-computer-science-definition-and-understanding [https://perma.cc/34ZZ-UNSE].
32. See Machine Learning, IBM CLOUD (July 15, 2020), https://www.ibm.com/cloud/
learn/machine-learning [https://perma.cc/FRH6-8WSX].
33. Data, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/data [https://perma.cc/H3JL-CLYV]. This is a broad generalization and excludes other
definitions of data, including Data, the Soong-type synthetic intelligence android who
served as second officer aboard the USS Enterprise-D and later the USS Enterprise-E, in
the science fiction television franchise Star Trek. See Data (Star Trek), WIKIPEDIA, https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_(Star_Trek) [https://perma.cc/RS5G-ZJZK].
34. Data, supra note 33.
35. See Wolff, supra note 14 (“The features, tags, and relevancy of your training data
will be the ‘textbooks’ from which your model will learn.”).
36. See id.
37. What Is a Machine Learning Model?, MICROSOFT (Dec. 30, 2021), https://
docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/ai/windows-ml/what-is-a-machine-learning-model
[https://perma.cc/TJ2A-W8GU].
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between flavors and the deliciousness and uses those patterns to make
predictions on deliciousness of future ice cream flavors.
B. HOW MACHINE LEARNING WORKS
One of the most popular forms of AI today is machine learning.38 Machine learning is a process for drawing conclusions or making predictions
by feeding new data into a machine learning model, an algorithm that is
first trained on an initial data set.39
As noted by David Lehr and Paul Ohm, among others, when legal
scholars speak about machine learning, the result is often muddled40—a
consequence perhaps of the fact that legal scholars sometimes comment
on matters of law and technology despite having no formal training in the
technology at hand. Lehr and Ohm argue that legal scholars overly abstract the concept of machine learning, analyzing legal issues related to it
without fully paying attention to the technical realities of machine learning.41 Fully explaining the technical details of machine learning is beyond
the scope of this Paper. However, it is necessary to first build a foundation of understanding for key machine learning concepts in order to proceed with a discussion of the legal issues, especially given that this Article
introduces a technical concept—the algorithmic shadow.
In broad strokes, here is how machine learning works. A human or
group of humans (“the programmer”) begins with a goal.42 The programmer decides to create a machine learning system to achieve a particular
goal, like generating predictions or drawing insights on existing data.43
The programmer then collects or creates an initial set of data to use as
training data;44 best practices include setting aside a set of data to test the
model.45 The programmer uses statistical methods to ready the training
data for use, including cleaning, coding, and categorizing the data.46 The
programmer next designs an algorithm (a set of instructions) for the computer to use.47 This algorithm will instruct the computer on how to process the data and how to achieve whatever goal the programmer initially
38. For example, a 2020 study from the consulting firm Deloitte showed that 67% of
surveyed companies claimed to be using machine learning at the time of the survey, and
97% planned to use it within the next year. DELOITTE AI INST., STATE OF AI IN THE
ENTERPRISE: THRIVING IN THE ERA OF PERVASIVE AI 6 (3d ed. 2020), https://
www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/cn/Documents/about-deloitte/deloitte-cn-dttthriving-in-the-era-of-persuasive-ai-en-200819.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UFN-XTMC].
39. See MEREDITH BROUSSARD, ARTIFICIAL UNINTELLIGENCE: HOW COMPUTERS
MISUNDERSTAND THE WORLD 93–97, 101–14 (2018).
40. See David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should
Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 655–56 (2017).
41. See id. at 655–57, 661–64.
42. See id. at 672–74.
43. See id. at 672–74, 717.
44. See id. at 665, 677.
45. See id. at 684–86.
46. See id. at 681, 683.
47. See id. at 688–89.
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designed the machine learning system to achieve.48 The programmer then
uses the initial set of data (training data) to train the machine learning
model by asking the computer to process the data using the algorithm,
find the underlying patterns in the data, and use those patterns to create a
model that can then achieve the goal set out by the programmer.49
There are different ways to design a machine learning system. The two
primary methods are supervised learning and unsupervised learning.50
With supervised learning, the programmer knows what they are looking
for from the outset.51 The programmer identifies the type of outcome
they seek and classifies, or labels, the data for that purpose.52 For example, a supervised machine learning system may be designed to predict the
likelihood that a student will graduate high school based on parental income. When designing this system, the programmer knows what they are
looking for: the relationship between parental income and student graduation. So, they classify these two variables in the data and ask the machine to predict student graduation based on parental income given an
analysis of the labeled data set.
With unsupervised learning, the programmer does not necessarily
know what they are looking for.53 Rather, they use unsupervised learning
processes to determine the underlying relationships or patterns within the
data.54 For example, maybe the programmer obtains another data set on
student graduation rates, but now, in addition to data on parental income,
they also have data on student age, race, gender, height, favorite subject,
favorite color, least favorite ice cream flavor, and mother’s maiden name.
The programmer is not sure exactly what pattern to look for here, but the
programmer can instruct an unsupervised machine learning system to
identify clusters in the data or relationships between different variables.55
This can help the programmer identify some useful conclusions from the
data.
Once the computer has generated a trained machine learning model,
the programmer can use the machine learning system with new data.56
The programmer can input new data, and the machine learning system
will give them new outputs based on that new data by using the algorithms in the machine learning model.57 The computer can then refine the
machine learning model with each new piece of data, updating the algorithms it uses as new data confirms or disputes the patterns it previously
48. See id. at 671.
49. See id. at 671, 695–96.
50. See Julianna Delua, Supervised vs. Unsupervised Learning: What’s the Difference?,
IBM CLOUD BLOG (Mar. 12, 2021), https://www.ibm.com/cloud/blog/supervised-vs-unsupervised-learning [https://perma.cc/2444-GRZS].
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 40, at 701–02.
57. See id.
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identified.58 In this way, the machine learning system will continue to
“learn” and refine its accuracy, thereby improving its “intelligence.”
C. APPLICATIONS

OF

AI

AND

MACHINE LEARNING

In our present time, most popular uses of AI rely on machine learning.59 Machine learning is currently used in criminal justice settings, as
can be seen in the COMPAS algorithm example60 and in predictive policing (e.g., using algorithms to determine which neighborhoods require
heavier police presence).61 These machine learning systems show up not
only in law enforcement and criminal justice but in many areas of life,
including education,62 employment,63 housing,64 and more.
While many modern uses of machine learning are relatively unseen by
the public, there are a few areas where individuals can visibly witness the
direct impact of algorithmic decision-making systems. Perhaps the most
familiar arena that people understand to utilize automated decision-making systems and machine learning is finance; credit scores, loan determinations, and trading strategies are all based on sophisticated algorithms.65
There are many sectors of society that now use AI and machine learning systems, and it is critical that we evaluate each use to ensure that
technologies are deployed in fair and just ways. It is particularly important that we evaluate the legal protections for AI and machine learning
systems making determinations that can curtail or protect fundamental
civil liberties and human rights. To protect these values in society, we
must invest in studying, auditing, and improving these systems, in addition to strongly considering the limits beyond which an algorithmic decision-making system should not be implemented. We must consider how
we can create legal protections for abuse of such systems, as the consequences of such abuse will can be significant, both for individuals and
society as a whole. As such, this Article focuses primarily on AI applications that implicate these important issues.
58. See id. at 702.
59. Richard M. Re & Alicia Solow-Niederman, Developing Artificially Intelligent Justice, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 242, 244–45 (2019).
60. See Angwin, Larson, Mattu & Kirchner, supra note 2.
61. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 40, at 655, 658. This Article does not discuss the
“robot judge,” who does not exist and may not merit a “who” at all. For further discussion
on the topic of robot judges, see Ryan Calo, Robots as Legal Metaphors, 30 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 209, 217–19 (2016); Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 59.
62. See, e.g., Lindsey Barrett, Rejecting Test Surveillance in Higher Education, 1 MICH.
ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2023).
63. See, e.g., Ifeoma Ajunwa, Algorithms at Work: Productivity Monitoring Applications and Wearable Technology as the New Data-Centric Research Agenda for Employment
and Labor Law, 63 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 21, 23 (2018).
64. See, e.g., EUBANKS, supra note 7, at 10–13.
65. Machine Learning (in Finance), CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/other/machine-learning-in-finance [https://perma.cc/7V6R6XQ3].
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Recently, an increasing number of laws dealing specifically with AI
have developed in different regions and states. In 2021 alone, seventeen
states introduced bills or resolutions regarding regulation of AI.66 Additionally, in 2021, the European Commission released the Artificial Intelligence Act, the European Union’s first legal framework for regulating
AI.67
Some of the laws relevant to regulation of AI are general privacy laws,
such as the General Data Protection Regulation, which includes provisions on rights to deletion and other privacy rights that relate to, and are
complicated by, AI.68 In the absence of a federal privacy law, U.S. states
continue to pass new state privacy laws.69
Ari Ezra Waldman theorized the recent wave of privacy laws and proposals on the state and federal level as the “second wave of privacy law,”
which is focused more on corporate compliance and personal control
over data, rather than on regulating population-level harms caused by
data-driven industries, power imbalances in the data ecosystem, and systemic inequities.70 This second wave stands in contrast to the first wave of
privacy law, which Waldman identifies as the early notice-and-choice and
privacy policy requirement regime.71 In analyzing these waves of privacy
law, Waldman ultimately urges critical privacy theorists to continue expanding the conversation around privacy law in order to better protect
privacy rights and values of justice and equity.72
Some of the failures of contemporary privacy laws in addressing the
realities of AI and machine learning could be ameliorated by a “third
wave” privacy law approach that evaluates data’s larger infrastructure
and its effects.73 Laws that focus on enforcing individuals’ rights or placing limitations on companies ignore the problems associated with the
larger data ecosystem, including the downstream harms suffered by individuals whose data is collected, aggregated, and used to develop machine
learning systems.74 The persistence of the algorithmic shadow is one of
these systemic issues that modern privacy laws do not solve for, perhaps
66. Legislation Related to Artificial Intelligence, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES
(Jan. 5, 2022), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/2020-legislation-related-to-artificial-intelligence.aspx [https://perma.cc/WX8Z-CHBC].
67. Eve Gaumond, Artificial Intelligence Act: What Is the European Approach for AI?,
LAWFARE (June 4, 2021, 11:50 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/artificial-intelligence-act
-what-european-approach-ai [https://perma.cc/ZD39-V3DR].
68. Ben Wolford, What Is GDPR, the EU’s New Data Protection Law?, GDPR.EU,
https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr [https://perma.cc/4DJC-BFB7].
69. See Thorin Klosowski, The State of Consumer Data Privacy Laws in the US (And
Why It Matters), N.Y. TIMES: WIRECUTTER (Sept. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
wirecutter/blog/state-of-privacy-laws-in-us [https://perma.cc/TUN7-B4ZT].
70. Ari Ezra Waldman, The New Privacy Law, 55 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 19,
21–22, 37–39 (2021).
71. See id. at 19, 22–24.
72. See id. at 40–41.
73. See id. at 38–41.
74. See id. at 38–39.
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due to the lack of critical, systems-based thinking that Waldman
conceptualizes.75
III. ALGORITHMIC SHADOWS
Deletion is a flawed remedy for privacy harms in machine learning systems due to the presence of algorithmic shadows that persist even after
data is deleted. The shadow of one’s data on a machine learning model
can still cause harm to an individual and to groups that relate to that
individual. These harms can be privacy harms, algorithmic harms, and discrimination harms. Thus, it is important that we understand what causes
algorithmic shadow harms and how to minimize or protect against them.
A. THE PERSISTENCE

OF

ALGORITHMIC SHADOWS

The persistence of the algorithmic shadow is a relatively simple concept
that is underdeveloped in the legal discourse surrounding machine learning and privacy. This concept relates to a problem with data deletion in
machine learning systems. Even after data is deleted from the data set a
programmer used to train a machine learning model, that act of deletion
has no impact on the already-trained model—the data used to train the
model already influenced the development of the model. Deleting the
data afterward does not remove the persistent shadow of the data in the
algorithm. In other words, the algorithmic shadow is what remains even
after data deletion has been completed. It is a problem that highlights the
flaws with deletion as a privacy remedy and privacy right, as well as some
of the problems with current legal thinking around privacy and AI
generally.
Consider a machine learning system trained to identify whether an
animal in a photo is a cat. If you train the image recognition algorithm to
recognize photos of cats, and you only input photos of orange cats, the
resulting algorithm trained on this data might be more likely to recognize
orange cats as cats and may be less able to predict when a grey-furred
animal is a cat. Let’s say you decide later that the algorithm you have
designed and trained is now too “biased” in favor of identifying orange
animals as cats. You want to fix this. You might choose then to delete all
photos of orange cats from the training data set. However, this would
have no impact on the algorithm that has already been trained on the
data. The algorithm will still over-predict orange animals to be cats. Even
if the data is deleted from the original data set, the “shadow” of the data
remains on the algorithm.
To further explain the persistence of algorithmic shadows, consider the
following disgusting metaphor76: A conceptual artist who moonlights as a
serial killer harvests one hundred human ears and uses them to create a
75. See id. passim.
76. Thank you to the participants of the Law and Technology Workshop for inspiring
and listening to this metaphor described in detail in person.
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sculpture. He places each of the ears on a surface of wet clay, which dries
into a terrible blob covered in human ears. One of the serial killer’s victims miraculously survives and now requests his ear back. Detectives and
art gallery personnel are able to remove the ear from the surface of the
sculpture, but the imprint of the ear persists. While the victim may have
the ear back to use at his disposal, he can never erase the imprint of his
ear on the resulting sculpture. The victim still suffers harm—both the
harm of the physical violence and the psychological and emotional harm
of seeing the imprint of his ear on the sculpture. The earless man is analogous to the data subject of a privacy violation, whose data (ear) has been
stolen and misused by a privacy violator (serial killer) to create a machine
learning model (clay and ear sculpture). While the data subject can request that their data be deleted (that the ear be pulled from the sculpture), the subject cannot remove the persistent algorithmic shadow—the
imprint of their data on the resulting machine learning model.
Data deletion does not fix the psychological and emotional harms of
knowing that your data has been used and misused to train a machine
learning model, particularly if that model is offensive or harmful to you.77
For example, the use of facial recognition in law enforcement surveillance
is controversial.78 Many people do not support the practice and likely
would not consent to the inclusion of photos of their faces into databases
for use in developing facial recognition models for surveillance.79 Even if
a surveillance company is required to delete individuals’ photos, the harm
of having one’s photo included in a facial recognition surveillance machine learning model remains because the algorithmic shadow still persists as an imprint on the machine learning model itself and on the
predictions it makes for surveillance.
B. THE HARMS

OF

ALGORITHMIC SHADOWS

This Article addresses two categories of harms related to the persistence of algorithmic shadows: first, privacy and algorithmic harms that
are worsened by the presence and lack of acknowledgement of algorithmic shadows; and second, unique harms caused by algorithmic
shadows.
1. Existing Harms Made Worse
The lingering presence of algorithmic shadows worsens some existing
privacy harms that are already mentioned in privacy laws, including
77. See Danielle Keats Citron & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Harms, 102 B.U. L. REV.
793, 796–97, 841–44, 855–56 (2022); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA.
L. REV. 477, 486 (2006). But see Ann Bartow, Response, A Feeling of Unease About Privacy Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 52, 56–57, 60–62 (2006).
78. See Nicol Turner Lee & Caitlin Chin, Police Surveillance and Facial Recognition:
Why Data Privacy Is Imperative for Communities of Color, BROOKINGS (Apr. 12, 2022),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/police-surveillance-and-facial-recognition-why-dataprivacy-is-an-imperative-for-communities-of-color [https://perma.cc/WBS2-XTJA].
79. See id.
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harms related to use of automated decision-making systems. Algorithmic
bias and discrimination are known problems with use of automated decision-making systems—bias can creep in a number of ways, and many algorithmic systems can be implemented in ways that lead to
discrimination.80 While some laws are beginning to target the discriminatory impact of some of these systems,81 few have specifically noted the
impact of algorithmic shadows and the difficulties with data deletion as a
remedy or as protection from harm.
Furthermore, due to lack of understanding regarding complications
like lasting algorithmic shadows, many privacy laws rely on protections
like rights to deletion, even though those protections are insufficient.82
Thus, harms related to privacy loss and surveillance are generally exacerbated due to false reliance on solutions that do not actually work. Because we do not accept algorithmic shadow harms, we continue to use
deletion as a flawed remedy, further enforcing the justification for surveillance everywhere and failing to protect vulnerable populations.
2. New Privacy Harms
In addition to the types of privacy harms that current privacy laws seek
to remedy, there are also new harms that have arisen due to the increased
use of algorithmic systems. With the increase in mass surveillance and
algorithmic decision-making systems, more attention has been paid to
group privacy harms.83 These are harms suffered by groups and communities due to privacy violations, as opposed to exclusively individual
harms.84 These group privacy harms are particularly important in light of
algorithmic shadows. While data deletion and contesting automated decisions may be viable solutions for individuals who are upset about the inclusion of their data in certain algorithmic systems, these solutions do not
provide a remedy for the privacy infringements suffered by entire
groups—communities and groups of individuals who may be similar to
the data subject, and who thus may find themselves at the mercy of algorithmic systems predisposed towards them in ways that are harmful.
These sorts of group privacy harms can include “discrimination by association” or discrimination against people who are classified or profiled
as part of a protected class regardless of whether they belong to it.85 Additionally, individuals may suffer inferential privacy harms. This is a general category of group privacy harms that stem from the idea that
80. See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Kate Kaye, This Senate Bill Would Force Companies to Audit AI Used for
Housing and Loans, PROTOCOL (Feb. 8, 2022), https://www.protocol.com/enterprise/revised-algorithmic-accountability-bill-ai [https://perma.cc/DN2C-BHDN].
82. See infra Section IV.B.
83. See Luciano Floridi, Group Privacy: A Defence and an Interpretation, in GROUP
PRIVACY: NEW CHALLENGES OF DATA TECHNOLOGIES 83 (Linnet Taylor, Luciano Floridi
& Bart van der Sloot eds., 2017).
84. See Citron & Solove, supra note 77, at 818–19, 855.
85. Sandra Wachter, Affinity Profiling and Discrimination by Association in Online
Behavioral Advertising, 35 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 367, 373 (2020).
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algorithmic systems can analyze data to make assumptions—inferences—
about a person; these inferences may even relate to data not present in
the initial training set.86 In fact, these inferences may relate to individuals
whose data are not included in the training set at all.87
In a similar vein, the concept of the algorithmic shadow also sheds light
on the importance of third-party privacy harms or distributed privacy
harms. Distributed privacy harms are the privacy harms suffered by individuals who are not themselves the primary data subjects in the act of
data collection or processing, perhaps best exemplified by the harms of
genetic privacy violations.88 For example, if an individual submits their
DNA sample to a DNA processing company like 23andMe, not only do
they give up some of their own genetic privacy to the corporation, but
they also give up the privacy of everyone in their genetic line.89 Thus, the
initial data subject’s biological family members also suffered a privacy
loss, though they were not involved at any stage of the actual data collection or processing. Privacy laws currently do not provide a remedy or
protection for individuals who suffer third-party, proxy privacy harms.90
The increase in algorithmic systems and the persistence of algorithmic
shadows means there are new and growing classes of people whose privacy rights are at stake, through no fault or action of their own.
IV. DATA DELETION
Many privacy laws provide a right to request data deletion, and enforcement agencies mandate deletion in privacy law enforcement.91 However, data deletion fails as a privacy remedy for two reasons. First, privacy
laws that require data deletion fail to define data deletion, leaving significant room for confusion, error, and many instances in which following the
letter of the law does not reflect the spirit of that law at all. Second, data
deletion fails as a remedy for the misuse of data in machine learning due
to the technical realities of machine learning itself.
A. DATA DELETION

AS

RIGHT

AND

REMEDY

Discussion around contemporary privacy laws often advocates for
86. See Sandra Wachter & Brent Mittelstadt, A Right to Reasonable Inferences: ReThinking Data Protection Law in the Age of Big Data and AI, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
494, 497–98 (2019).
87. See Alicia Solow-Niederman, Information Privacy and the Inference Economy, 117
NW. UNIV. L. REV. 357 (2022).
88. See Terry Wong, Note, Characterizing the Harms of Compromised Genetic Information for Article III Standing in Data Breach Litigation, 53 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
461, 505–07 (2019).
89. See Richard Acello, The New Frontier of Health Care Is Here, But Will DNA Privacy be Lost?, A.B.A. J. (June 1, 2021, 1:30 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/
article/23-and-you-dna-privacy [https://perma.cc/6HNN-RGHR].
90. See Wong, supra note 88, at 476.
91. See Alan McQuinn & Daniel Castro, The Costs of an Unnecessarily Stringent Federal Data Privacy Law, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 12, 14 (Aug. 5, 2019), https://
itif.org/sites/default/files/2019-cost-data-privacy-law.pdf [https://perma.cc/GBQ3-GPVQ].
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rights to data deletion or erasure.92 The European Union’s General Data
Protection Regulation includes the “right to be forgotten,” which gives
data subjects the “right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay.”93 “[T]he controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay”
as long as a number of conditions are met.94 The GDPR does not define
deletion or what qualifies as full deletion or erasure of a data subject’s
data.95 The statute does note that data controllers must, in “taking account of available technology and the cost of implementation, . . . take
reasonable steps, including technical measures, to inform [other] controllers” processing data included in the subject’s invocation of their right to
erasure “of any links to, or copy or replication of, those personal data.”96
This provision recognizes that data, once transferred or made public, is
difficult to fully delete from the long memory of the internet. However,
this is the extent of the technical discussion in the Regulation itself.
Under the GDPR’s right to be forgotten, individuals can request that
their data be deleted and that links or copies of such data be deleted as
well.97 This often results in requests to publications, data depositories,
and search engines, as seen in the 2014 case, Google Spain SL v. Agencia
Española de Protección de Datos.98 This case dealt with the General Data
Protection Directive (the “Directive”), the forebear of the GDPR.99 The
claimant, in this case, Mr. Costeja González, requested that Google delete links to news articles that included outdated negative information
about him.100 After various appeals, the Court of Justice of the European
Union ruled that Google was responsible as a data controller for processing the personal data of Costeja González and that Google and Google
Spain were within the territorial scope of the Directive.101 Employing a
balancing test to weigh Costeja González’s privacy rights against the interests of Google along with those of the public, the court ultimately
ruled in favor of Costeja González.102 Specifically, the court held that
Google must “remove from the list of results displayed following a
search . . . of a person’s name links to web pages, published by third
parties and containing information relating to that person.”103 The decision noted that Costeja González; the Spanish, Italian, and Polish Gov92. See, e.g., David L. Hudson, Jr., Right to be Forgotten, FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEFREE SPEECH CTR. (2017), https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1562/right-to-beforgotten [https://perma.cc/F6Y7-77JL].
93. GDPR, supra note 21, art. 17(1).
94. Id.
95. See id. art. 4.
96. Id. art. 17, at 2.
97. See id.
98. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos
(AEPD), ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, ¶¶ 14–15 (May 13, 2014).
99. See id. ¶ 1; Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
100. Google Spain SL, Case C-131/12, ¶¶ 14–15.
101. Id. ¶¶ 42–60.
102. Id. ¶¶ 74, 80–81, 97–99.
103. Id. ¶ 88.
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ernments; and the European Commission all called for Google “to
withdraw from its indexes and intermediate memory information containing personal data that has been published by third parties.”104 However,
the court did not pass judgment specifically on whether removal from
indexes and intermediate memory would be necessary or sufficient for
the removal ultimately required of Google.105
The Google Spain case was influential in determining the territoriality
of European data privacy law, the boundaries of data processing and data
controlling, and the right to be forgotten. However, the case also illustrates the failure of deletion as a privacy right or remedy. Here, the court
called for data erasure but did not specify what erasure would entail.106
In providing guidance on the implementation of the Google Spain decision, the Article 29 Working Party advised that search engine operators
must, if requested, remove links to articles from public indexes but can
still retain copies of those links in internal data storage and can still use
those links for internal purposes.107 The Working Party Guidelines also
state that the right to deletion “does not require deletion of the link from
the indexes of the search engine altogether. That is, the original information will still be accessible using other search terms, or by direct access to
the publisher’s original source.”108 In fact, the guidance specifically suggests that “complete deletion of the page from the indexes of the search
engine” is unnecessary.109 Thus, the right to erasure or the right to be
forgotten is rather limited in scope due to the lack of clarity surrounding
the legal clauses requiring deletion.
While the limitations on the right to be forgotten may seem inconsequential, this limitation could lead to individuals being unable to access
the privacy protection the law attempts to provide. For example, Google’s
search algorithm uses a variety of factors to determine the ranking of
search results that show up when a user enters a query.110 The data from
the removed links may still be used as part of Google’s search algorithm,
even after the links have been removed. This could influence future
search results, which could negatively harm the individual. Furthermore,
this limited right to deletion may not protect against privacy harms associated with the inclusion of links to negative news stories in one or more
of Google’s databases. Thus, it is unclear if this level of “deletion” is
enough to truly protect an individual’s privacy rights.
104. Id. ¶ 65.
105. See id. ¶ 88.
106. See id.
107. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the Implementation of the
Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment on “Google Spain and Inc v. Agencia
Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González” C-131/12, at 2, 14/
EN WP 225 (Nov. 26, 2014).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 9.
110. How Search Algorithms Work, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/search/howsearchworks/algorithms [https://perma.cc/GH75-UBHY].
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Limitations on the effectiveness of rights to data deletion and record
erasure may stem from confusion over how to quantify privacy harms
(and how to remedy them) and privacy rights (and how to protect them).
Nonetheless, it is important to understand the benefit and limits of data
deletion as privacy remedy, as it is so commonly used today.
B. AGAINST DATA DELETION
As described above, many privacy laws now include a right to deletion
or right to erasure, allowing users to advocate for their own rights by
requesting deletion of their data.111 However, this approach is flawed in
multiple ways. First, on a legal basis, privacy laws that enshrine a right to
deletion often fail to specifically define the steps required for a data-controlling entity to successfully delete data as required by law.112 This creates confusion and complicates the use of data deletion as a remedy or
right; it is difficult to know if or when a wrong has been righted or an
individual has been able to enforce their rights.
Further, individuals often lack full understanding of their rights to deletion and are thus unable to utilize them fully. In trying to understand
these data rights, most individuals who visit a website or use an app—
aside from privacy lawyers or legal scholars—have only a privacy policy
and perhaps a set of privacy settings to reference. Consumers not understanding privacy rights, even when—or especially when—provided to
them in privacy notices, is not a new problem unique to the right to deletion.113 Privacy notices and options, including options to request deletion,
can be malformed, resulting in confusion for users regardless of the data
controller’s good intent (and sometimes as a result of deliberate
111. See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105 (West
2018); GDPR, supra note 21, art. 17. Other countries, like Germany have caselaw around
privacy that suggests a right to be forgotten. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 3, 1980, 54 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHS [BVERFGE] 148, 155 (Ger.) (holding an individual had a constitutional right to
informational self-determination—the right to set parameters for personal information
conveyed to others).
112. As quoted above, Article seventeen of the GDPR grants individuals “the right to
obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without
undue delay.” GDPR, supra note 21, art. 17(1). However, the regulation does not provide
much guidance to controllers who must perform that erasure. Section two of Article seventeen directs controllers to “take reasonable steps, including technical measures” to retrieve
the relevant data from third parties. Id. art. 17(2).
113. See generally Benjamin Fabian, Tatiana Ermakova & Tino Lentz, Large-Scale
Readability Analysis of Privacy Policies, PROC. INT’L CONF. ON WEB INTEL. 18 (Aug. 2017)
(analyzing the readability of nearly 50,000 website privacy policies); Pedro Giovanni Leon,
Justin Cranshaw, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Jim Graves, Manoj Hastak, Blase Ur & Guzi Xu,
What Do Online Behavioral Advertising Privacy Disclosures Communicate to Users?,
PROC. 2012 ACM WORKSHOP ON PRIV. ELEC. SOC’Y 19 (Oct. 2012) (finding that users do
not read or remember disclosures about privacy in Online Behavioral Advertising); Hana
Habib, Yixin Zou, Aditi Jannu, Neha Sridhar, Chelse Swoopes, Alessandro Acquisti, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Norman Sadeh & Florian Schaub, An Empirical Analysis of Data Deletion and Opt-Out Choices on 150 Websites, PROC. FIFTEENTH USENIX SYMP. ON USABLE
PRIV. & SEC. 387 (Aug. 2019), https://www.usenix.org/system/files/soups2019-habib.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L7LS-N7CR] (identifying issues with websites’ opt out and data deletion
options).
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obfuscation).114
Specifically, in regard to the right to deletion, empirical research has
shown mixed results when giving individuals information about rights to
deletion. Users have expectations about data deletion that are not borne
out due to the technical realities of the process.115 For example, users
may believe that requesting data deletion from a platform also means the
company will delete the data from its private storage, which may not be
the case.116 Deleting content from platforms can even backfire for individuals. Public figures may find that their choices to delete certain posts
may actually attract more attention to said posts (a sort of deletion-related variant of the Streisand Effect),117 particularly as a number of accounts and mechanisms have popped up specifically to track content
deletion.118
Furthermore, deletion might not even be a right that individuals want.
Some research has shown that individuals do not want their content to
fade over time but rather find value in being able to access the content
they posted, even content that is old and forgotten.119 Thus, there may be
a mismatch between what the right to deletion seeks to accomplish (protection of privacy by removing data) and what individuals actually want
(protection of privacy while keeping data).
Even when consumers are able to access and understand privacy notices and options like deletion requests, the use of deletion as a mechanism to protect privacy can be flawed due to the technical realities of
machine learning systems, including the unacknowledged persistence of
the algorithmic shadow. The practical implications of the data deletion
remedy stated in the law might not be clear to the people implementing
the law on the ground or to users relying on the right to data deletion.
114. Ari Ezra Waldman, Cognitive Biases, Dark Patterns, and the ‘Privacy Paradox,’ 31
CURRENT OP. PSYCH. 105, 106–08 (2020).
115. See Mohsen Minaei, Mainack Mondal & Aniket Kate, Empirical Understanding of
Deletion Privacy: Experiences, Expectations, and Measures, 31ST USENIX SEC. SYMP.
(Aug. 2022), https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec22summer_minaei.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7ZAH-HLCQ].
116. See Ambar Murillo, Andreas Kramm, Sebastian Schnorf & Alexander De Luca,
“If I Press Delete, It’s Gone”—User Understanding of Online Data Deletion and Expiration, PROC. FOURTEENTH USENIX SYMP. ON USABLE PRIV. & SEC. 329, 334 (Aug. 2018),
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/soups2018/soups2018-murillo.pdf [https://
perma.cc/NB3R-329S].
117. See Mario Cacciottolo, The Streisand Effect: When Censorship Backfires, BBC
NEWS (June 15, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-18458567 [https://perma.cc/UV94226B].
118. See Mohsen Minaei, S Chandra Mouli, Mainack Mondal, Bruno Ribeiro & Aniket
Kate, Deceptive Deletions for Protecting Withdrawn Posts on Social Media Platforms,
PROC. 27TH ANN. NETWORK & DISTRIBUTED SYS. SEC. SYMP. (Feb. 2021), https://
www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/ndss2021_3A-2_23139_paper.pdf [https://
perma.cc/K8RC-UNJQ].
119. See Lujo Bauer, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Saranga Komanduri, Michelle L. Mazurek,
Michael K. Reiter, Manya Sleeper & Blase Ur, The Post Anachronism: The Temporal Dimension of Facebook Privacy, PROC. 12TH ACM WORKSHOP ON PRIV. ELEC. SOC’Y 1, 9
(Nov. 2013), https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/2517840.2517859 [https://perma.cc/HSU3FJHD].
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Machine learning further complicates the question of data deletion.
This is particularly apparent due to the persistent presence of the algorithmic shadow. As explained above, programmers find or create a set
of data to be used as training data in contemporary machine learning.120
Humans collect, create, clean, codify, and otherwise prepare this training
data for use in building the machine learning system.121 Humans then
create an algorithm and ask a computer to run that algorithm on the
training data set to detect patterns and produce a machine learning model
that can then be used to solve problems, generate predictions, or otherwise achieve a programmer’s goal.122
Data deletion does not eliminate the algorithmic shadow. Deleting
data from the training data set (the initial data set fed into the computer
to train and produce a machine learning model) has no impact on an
already trained model. This means that an imprint from the individual
user will still remain, though all “data” has been deleted. The algorithmic
shadow persists, which means some measure of privacy loss cannot be
undone through the act of data deletion. Thus, there is a disconnect between the practical reality of data deletion and its supposed goals.
V. ALGORITHMIC DISGORGEMENT
Recently, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) introduced a new potential remedy for consumer protection violations caused by companies’
use of improperly obtained data to train machine learning algorithms.123
This new enforcement mechanism would require companies not only to
delete improperly collected data (something that is routine in FTC enforcement) but also to delete any machine learning models trained on
that data (something previously unseen in FTC judgments).124 Requiring
model deletion could effectively require companies to “roll back” their
models to the time before the improperly obtained data was introduced
and thus retrain them without the deleted data.
This rather radical enforcement mechanism entails requiring companies to delete machine learning models or algorithms trained on the misbegotten data—a mechanism journalist Kate Kaye titled “algorithmic
destruction.”125 FTC Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter described it
in perhaps less explosive terms as “an innovative disgorgement remedy.”126 Whether we call it algorithmic destruction, algorithmic disgorgement, or perhaps simply machine learning model deletion, this new
120. Supra text accompanying notes 44–46.
121. Id.
122. Supra text accompanying notes 47–48.
123. See Kaye, supra note 11.
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at
the Future of Privacy Forum’s Annual Privacy Papers for Policymakers Event: Protecting
Consumer Privacy in a Time of Crisis 2 (Feb. 10, 2021) [hereinafter Comm’r Slaughter
Keynote Address], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1587283/
fpf_opening_remarks_210_.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LBE-P2TX].
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remedy is revolutionary in scope and deserves serious consideration, particularly in light of the existing problems with data deletion and the persistence of algorithmic shadows.
A. THE RADICAL FTC
There is a saying in journalism: one is an accident, two is a coincidence,
and three is a trend.127 Thus far, three major FTC cases have included
some variation of algorithmic disgorgement as a remedy.128 This lasting
trend, backed by statements from FTC Commissioners, shows what is
likely becoming a new push from the FTC to establish algorithmic disgorgement as a routine privacy remedy.129
The FTC first introduced the concept of model deletion as a remedy in
its enforcement decree against Cambridge Analytica in 2019 after the
company engaged in deceptive practices to exploit its access to users on
the social media platform Facebook and collect and use data without user
consent.130 The FTC ordered Cambridge Analytica to “[d]elete or destroy all Covered Information collected from consumers through [its application], and any information or work product, including any algorithms
or equations, that originated, in whole or in part, from this Covered Information.”131 Here, the destruction of “work product, including any algorithms or equations[ ] that originated” from the user information in
question could be read to include any machine learning models that were
created with training data that included ill-gotten data, as well as any resulting models that were refined after being fed ill-gotten user data.132
While the 2019 Cambridge Analytica case was likely the first time the
FTC employed this novel remedy, the idea of algorithmic disgorgement
as a remedy really gained traction with the FTC’s 2021 enforcement action against Everalbum, Inc. (Ever), a photo storage and organization application company.133 Ever had created a facial recognition tool for its
application, giving users a pop-up message that claimed to allow users to
choose whether they wished to turn the face recognition feature on or
127. See, e.g., Renee Montagne, Two Is a Coincidence, Three Is a Trend, NPR (Jan. 29,
2013), https://www.npr.org/2013/01/29/170535707/two-is-a-coincidence-threes-a-trend
[https://perma.cc/8U2T-XPE2]; Jeffrey Lewis, It’s Not as Easy as 1-2-3, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Aug. 1, 2012), https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/01/its-not-as-easy-as-1-2-3 [https://
perma.cc/SA3U-LEDN] (using the phrase in response to behavior from the State
Department).
128. See Kaye, supra note 11.
129. See id.
130. See Complaint at 1, 12–13, Cambridge Analytica, LLC, FTC File No. 1823107, No.
9383 (F.T.C. July 22, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/
182_3107_cambridge_analytica_administrative_complaint_7-24-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2FU6-EN9G].
131. Final Order at 4, Cambridge Analytica, LLC, FTC File No. 1823107, No. 9383
(F.T.C. Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/
d09389_comm_final_orderpublic.pdf [https://perma.cc/6G84-QEPF].
132. See id.
133. See Complaint ¶ 3, Everalbum, Inc., FTC File No. 1923172, No. C-4743 (F.T.C.
May 6, 2021) [hereinafter Ever Complaint], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
cases/1923172_-_everalbum_complaint_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9B83-KPLP].

500

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

off.134 However, the FTC found that Ever did not actually give users a
meaningful choice.135 For users in some jurisdictions, the face recognition
feature was enabled by default, and there was no ability for users to disable it.136 Ever used these users’ photos to train its machine learning
models for face recognition, arguably without informed consent from
users.137
Ever also collected other face images from its users and combined
them with publicly available datasets to create a variety of datasets used
to develop facial recognition technology.138 Ever did have an option for
users to deactivate their accounts, stating in multiple settings that the
company would delete the user’s information upon deactivation.139 However, the FTC found that Ever was not deleting photos and videos upon
deactivation but was storing them instead.140
So far, the case sounds relatively routine for an FTC enforcement action involving privacy. In the absence of federal privacy law, the FTC
enforces privacy actions based on its § 5 authority to regulate unfair and
misleading practices to consumers.141 Here, the identified issues were
Ever’s misrepresentations involving the ability for users to opt in or opt
out of face recognition and misrepresentations that Ever would delete
user photos and videos upon deactivation.142
What made this enforcement action radical was the new remedy introduced by the FTC as part of the settlement order. In addition to requiring
Ever to delete the photos and videos of users who had requested their
accounts deactivated, the FTC also required the company to “delete or
destroy all Face Embeddings derived from Biometric Information Respondent collected from Users who have not . . . consent[ed]” and to
“delete or destroy any Affected Work Product.”143 Elsewhere in the Order, the FTC defined “Face Embedding” as “data, such as a numeric vector, derived in whole or in part from an image of an individual’s face.”144
It is important to note that such Face Embedding could itself be the product of a machine learning system that was trained on face image data,
potentially face image data from non-consenting users. Thus, asking for
134. See id. ¶¶ 5–7.
135. See id. ¶¶ 10, 23–24.
136. See id. ¶ 10.
137. See id. ¶ 11.
138. See id. ¶ 12.
139. See id. ¶¶ 17–18, 20.
140. See id. ¶¶ 22, 26.
141. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (granting the FTC power to
regulate “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce”); see also Daniel
J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 583, 598–99 (2014) (quoting the Act as the “primary source of authority
for FTC privacy enforcement”).
142. See Ever Complaint, supra note 133, ¶¶ 23–27.
143. Decision and Order at 4–5, Everalbum, Inc., FTC File No. 1923172, No. C-4743
(F.T.C. May 6, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/1923172_-_everalbum_decision_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/JD4K-XYJT].
144. Id. at 3.
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the deletion of the Face Embeddings could also mean the deletion of
some machine learning models.
The Commission defined “Affected Work Product” even more clearly:
“any models or algorithms developed in whole or in part using Biometric
Information Respondent collected from Users of the ‘Ever’ mobile application.”145 This is one of the most revolutionary calls the FTC has ever
made regarding AI. Essentially, as a remedy for privacy violations suffered by individuals whose data was used without their consent, the FTC
required Ever to delete any models or algorithms that had been developed using the misbegotten user data.
This kind of algorithmic destruction or algorithmic disgorgement is a
radical remedy. The model deletion remedy goes much further than the
traditional remedy of asking companies to delete users’ data. Remember
that the input of any data into a machine learning system helps shape and
refine the machine learning model, thus leaving a persisting algorithmic
shadow. While traditional data deletion would not correct the harms of
the persistent algorithmic shadow, model deletion has the potential to
solve such harms. By requiring companies to delete the models trained on
user data, the FTC essentially eliminates the algorithmic shadow. The
company would have to retrain its models based on a data set that does
not include and was not influenced by the shadow of the individual’s data.
More recently, in 2022, the FTC employed algorithmic disgorgement
once again in its settlement with WW International, Inc. (WW International), formerly known as Weight Watchers, and a subsidiary called
Kurbo, Inc. (Kurbo).146 WW International and Kurbo had, among other
legal violations, collected the personal information of children under thirteen without proper parental information, in defiance of the Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Act.147 The final settlement ordered the weight
loss company to delete or destroy any “Affected Work Product,” defined
as “any models or algorithms developed in whole or in part” using the illgotten personal information at controversy in this case.148 Here again, the
FTC employed algorithmic disgorgement as a remedy for a privacy violation, acknowledging that simple data deletion is not enough to remedy
such violations where companies use misbegotten data to develop machine learning models.

145. Id. at 2.
146. See Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction, Civil Penalty Judgment, and Other
Relief at 8, United States v. Kurbo, Inc., Case No. 3:22-cv-00946-TSH (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3,
2022), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/wwkurbostipulatedorder.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PR4Q-TMXJ] [hereinafter Kurbo Order].
147. See Complaint for Permanent Injunction, Civil Penalties, and Other Equitable Relief ¶¶ 1–2, 57, United States v. Kurbo, Inc., Case No. 22-CV-946 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2022),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/filed_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/BE3AA3HJ].
148. Kurbo Order, supra note 146, at 2, 8.
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REMEDY

Algorithmic disgorgement acts as a remedy by preventing unjust enrichment and eliminating the ill-gotten gains of privacy-violating companies.149 This concept pulls from a number of legal doctrines, including
unjust enrichment and disgorgement from contract law and remedies and
the fruit of the poisonous tree analysis in criminal procedure.150 Scholars
have discussed these questions before. For example, Bernard Chao has
written on the concept of privacy losses as wrongful gains,151 a theory
which could be extended to justify the use of algorithmic disgorgement as
a rather traditional remedy for unjust gain.
In a statement on the Everalbum case, former FTC Commissioner
Rohit Chopra celebrated the decision, in part because the FTC required
the malfeasant company to “forfeit the fruits of its deception.”152 This
phrasing directly links the deceptive acts of the company (clearly under
the FTC’s § 5 authority) with the remedy of algorithmic disgorgement.
Further justifying algorithmic disgorgement, Commissioner Slaughter
described the remedy as being similar to monetary disgorgement in a keynote speech at the Future of Privacy Forum in 2021:
We routinely obtain disgorgement of ill-gotten monetary gains when
consumers pay for a product that is marketed deceptively. Everalbum shows how we can apply this principle to privacy cases where
companies collect and use consumers’ data in unlawful ways: we
should require violators to disgorge not only the ill-gotten data[ ] but
also the benefits—here, the algorithms—generated from that
data.153
The message is clear: the FTC views algorithmic disgorgement as a remedy in line with both the FTC’s legal enforcement authority as well as
existing FTC precedent.
In a law review article, Commissioner Slaughter and co-authors Janice
Kopec and Mohamad Batal put it more simply: “The premise is simple:
when companies collect data illegally, they should not be able to profit
from either the data or any algorithm developed using it.”154 Algorithmic
disgorgement, then, could achieve a similar intended purpose as tradi149. See Heather Federman, Tainted Fruit: Disgorgement of Data from the FTC and
Beyond, IAPP: THE PRIVACY ADVISOR (Apr. 27, 2021), https://iapp.org/news/a/taintedfruit-disgorgement-of-data-from-the-ftc-and-beyond [https://perma.cc/ZWS5-2KMP].
150. See id.
151. See Bernard H. Chao, Privacy Losses as Wrongful Gains, 106 IOWA L. REV. 555,
557 (2021).
152. Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra In the Matter of Everalbum and Paravision, Comm’n File No. 1923172 (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_statements/1585858/updated_final_chopra_statement_on_everalbum_for_circulation.pdf [https://perma.cc/53J6PYTP].
153. Comm’r Slaughter Keynote Address, supra note 126, at 2.
154. Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, Janice Kopec & Mohamad Batal, Algorithms and Economic Justice: A Taxonomy of Harms and a Path Forward for the Federal Trade Commission, 23 YALE J.L. & TECH. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 39 (2021), https://yjolt.org/sites/default/files/
23_yale_j.l._tech._special_issue_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/PX84-FB2C].
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tional disgorgement—prevention of unjust enrichment for legal
wrongdoers.
Because data deletion does not solve the privacy loss that remains with
the persistent algorithmic shadow, algorithmic disgorgement may be a
more effective remedy. Data deletion as a remedy does not make whole
the privacy victim whose information still has a lasting imprint on the
resulting machine learning model; the algorithmic shadow of one’s information reflects a form of privacy loss that data deletion does not remedy.
In contrast, algorithmic disgorgement would erase the algorithmic
shadow, and the privacy victim’s information would no longer have an
imprint on the resulting machine learning model. Any machine learning
systems that had been developed with the use of the data subject’s information would be deleted, which at least ventures closer to making the
victim whole, as no part of them (or their data) is being actively misused
anymore.
C. ALGORITHMIC DISGORGEMENT

AS

RIGHT

The impact on individuals and the ability of this remedy to right some
algorithmic wrongs has been missing so far from the analysis of this new
remedy. While the FTC appears to believe algorithmic disgorgement
ought to be a privacy remedy, neither the FTC nor legislatures have
taken the next leap: establishing algorithmic disgorgement as a privacy
right.
Algorithmic disgorgement creates a financial penalty for companies,
but it also provides relief for users who have had their data misused. Algorithmic disgorgement succeeds where data deletion fails in preventing
the harms of the persistent algorithmic shadow. While rather blunt, algorithmic disgorgement goes further than data deletion in solving some
of the issues this Article raises in understanding the role of algorithmic
shadows and the related persistent harms. Algorithmic disgorgement,
then, can succeed as a legal remedy, at least on a theoretical basis (though
the practical realities of compliance may make it untenable).
However, it is one thing for enforcement agencies to use algorithmic
disgorgement as a penalty; it is another thing entirely to introduce the
right to request algorithmic disgorgement as a positive right for individuals. So far, no privacy law includes such a right. Introducing algorithmic
disgorgement as a privacy right in privacy law would increase the potential compliance burdens on companies but could also increase the deterrent effect, raising the risks to such an extent that companies would be
encouraged to be even more careful with their use of data and machine
learning. Machine learning in general lacks clear regulatory or legal
boundaries,155 but further legislative or regulatory actions are likely.
155. See generally, Mehtab Khan & Alex Hanna, The Subjects and Stages of AI Dataset
Development: A Framework for Dataset Accountability, 19 OHIO ST. TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2023); Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, Fair Learning, 99 TEXAS L. REV. 743 (2021).

504

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

Ultimately, if we believe in the seriousness of problems like the harms
of the persistent algorithmic shadow, as well as other group privacy
harms, indirect privacy harms, and proxy privacy harms, then we should
consider algorithmic disgorgement as a privacy right to be included in
privacy laws. However, the challenge in focusing on privacy rights is generally due to the fact that it is increasingly difficult for individuals to
know the extent of the violations that relate to their privacy.156 In today’s
complex data ecosystem, individuals are at a huge information disadvantage in comparison to the large corporations and governments that have
access to multiple streams of data collection and analysis of individuals’
data.157 Thus, relying on rights that place the burden on individuals for
enforcement may make it difficult for any individual to protect their own
privacy.
This is particularly apparent when we discuss issues like the improper
use of one’s data in machine learning systems or the harms of the algorithmic shadow. While these harms are very real, it is also quite possible that an individual may never have knowledge that their data is being
used to develop a machine learning system or that a persistent shadow of
their data exists even after their data has been deleted.
D. AGAINST ALGORITHMIC DISGORGEMENT
Algorithmic disgorgement as a remedy is relatively novel, and there are
still unresolved issues about what it means to suffer a privacy harm, to
remedy a harm, to enshrine a right to protect against harms, and so on.
For example, while algorithmic disgorgement may prevent a company
from unjustly enriching itself at the expense of privacy victims, algorithmic disgorgement may not do much to correct the harms incurred
by victims whose privacy rights have been violated. The psychological
harms of knowing one’s data has been released in a data breach,158 for
example, may not be ameliorated at all by the knowledge that the breaching company did not profit from your data.
However, legal issues aside, the chief problem with algorithmic disgorgement is that it is not a particularly practicable solution. Compliance
with algorithmic disgorgement orders may be costly, which could harm
smaller companies and potentially chill innovation.159 It is possible that
some developers will look at the risk of being forced to delete their
trained models and decide that the risk and costs are too great to proceed. Thus, algorithmic disgorgement could create economic harm for the
technology industry, which could, in turn, lead to greater social and policy
harms related to decreased national strength in technology. For example,
156. See Peter J. van de Waerdt, Information Asymmetries: Recognizing the Limits of
the GDPR on the Data-Driven Market, 38 COMPUT. L. & SEC. REV. 1, 2 (2020).
157. See id.
158. See Ido Kilovaty, Psychological Data Breach Harms, 23 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4
(2021); Citron & Solove, supra note 77, at 841.
159. See Tiffany C. Li, Post-Pandemic Privacy Law, 70 AM. U. L. REV. 101, 139 (2021).
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losing out on AI innovation could mean the United States has less of a
role in shaping global norms surrounding AI and privacy, and thus less of
an ability to advocate for democratic ideals with respect to AI, privacy,
and the future of technology.160
If deletion of machine learning training models becomes an established
and routine legal consequence for the deployment of a bad model or a
bad AI system in general, this might harm small startups and discourage
new market entrants in technology industries.161 These policies could
counterintuitively help further entrench outsized market power from Big
Tech companies, as they may be the only ones able to risk the financial
consequences of launching new AI-driven projects. Thus, there may need
to be limits to protect nonprofits, small startups, and other parties with
limited resources for compliance. These protections should be built into
any new laws that include model deletion as a consequence for misuse of
data or other legal violations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The persistence of the algorithmic shadow is one small reminder that
there are large gaps in much of our current privacy law. Even the most
recent privacy laws, as well as proposed AI laws, fail to address algorithmic shadow harms. Most of these laws similarly fail to adequately
address group privacy harms, proxy privacy harms, or indirect privacy
harms. Other gaps persist, including a lack of acknowledgment of critical
dimensions of privacy harms and privacy rights and the impact of digital
inequity, and the role of privacy as a civil right.162 While data deletion
does provide some measure of right and remedy for individuals, it is ultimately insufficient to meet its goals.163 Other proposed solutions like algorithmic disgorgement may be a better fit to solve some of the problems
that have not yet been addressed by law, including the harms of the algorithmic shadow. Though perhaps none of these solutions are sufficient
or even effective, and other algorithmic rights or remedies ought to be
considered.
More research is needed on the feasibility of model deletion, as well as
research on technical realities and economic costs for compliance. This is
certainly an area where interdisciplinary research is critical in order to
drive conversations forward in a meaningful way. Organizations, including the FTC, that consider algorithmic disgorgement as a right or remedy
must encourage and fund research on this question before lawyers and
policymakers treat algorithmic disgorgement as a routine remedy and
tool for privacy enforcement.
160. See id. at 137–39.
161. See Lemley and Casey, supra note 155, arguing that limiting the bounds of the fair
use defense for machine learning developers or users accused of copyright infringement
would chill innovation.
162. See Tiffany C. Li, Privacy as/and Civil Rights, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1265 (2022).
163. See, e.g., supra discussion in note 112.
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As the FTC is currently the de facto privacy commission for the United
States164 and the agency that first pushed model deletion, it will also be
necessary for the FTC to take issues like algorithmic shadow persistence
into account. Currently, in the absence of larger federal privacy law,
much of U.S. privacy enforcement has fallen to the FTC, which has, in
turn, built a body of FTC common law.165 With the leading role the FTC
has taken in privacy enforcement, it is especially important that the
agency carefully consider the practical and technical dimensions of model
deletion as an enforcement mechanism.
Ultimately, the debate around deletion should not center around data
deletion, algorithmic deletion, or model deletion. What must be deleted is
the siloed nature of scholarship and policymaking on matters of AI. We
must properly examine issues like algorithmic destruction as a legal remedy while there is still time before we fall victim to the destructive effects
of unrestrained AI development and applications. AI will only become
more important in the future, and it is imperative that we collaborate now
to create frameworks for protecting our rights and interests in a technosocial future that is hopefully better for all of us.

164. See CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND
POLICY 145, 192 (2016). See generally Steven Hetcher, The De Facto Federal Privacy Commission, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUT. & INFO. L. 109 (2000).
165. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 141, at 583.

